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ABSTRACT 
WP29 has recently adopted Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-making and 
Profiling for the purposes of General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679 (GDPR). Article 22 
GDPR bans all decisions that affect the data subject which have been based solely on 
automated processing. The Article eventually allows automatic processing, conditional on 
application of suitable safeguards for data subject rights. These safeguards might vary 
substantially depending on automated processing technologies. This article describes, firstly, 
the general safeguards to embed legal requirements. Secondly, the article explores solutions 
for automatic processing based on data analysis. It is argued that, although the data controller 
can put in place safeguards that respect data subject rights, a parallel empowerment of 
external authorities will be necessary to reach both: an informed external oversight, and the 
full application of this right. This article seeks to provide an analysis of Article 22 GDPR in 
the hope that this will inform the policy debate.     
Keywords: Article 22 GDPR; automated processing; data analysis; agreement technologies; 
multi-agent systems; internal/external oversight 
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1   THE RIGHT NOT TO BE SUBJECT TO A 
DECISION BASED SOLELY ON AUTOMATED 
PROCESSING  
According to Article 22 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)[2], “the data subject 
has the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including 
profiling, when it produces legal effects concerning him or her or at least it similarly 
significantly affects him or her”. Not all automatic processing is hence relevant for the GDPR; 
only that processing that has legal effects or significantly affects a person. Some conditions – 
contractual clauses between the data subject and the data controller, EU or Member State Law, 
and even a data subject’s explicit consent – could alleviate the strict prohibition of Article 22 
and legitimise automated processing. Decisions should not be based nonetheless on special 
categories of data mentioned in Article 9 (1) GDPR and should not concern a child[3].   
The new Regulation is clearly concerned with the final situation of individuals confronted 
with automatic decisions, i.e. a situation that significantly affects them. Whilst the Article 
allows automated decision-making processing when the data controller has obtained 
informed consent of the data subject or in the light of an existing contract between the data 
controller and the data processor, it also calls for the application of “suitable measures to 
safeguard the data subject’s rights and freedoms and legitimate interests.” These may include: 
 Specific information to the data subject 
 The right to obtain human intervention 
 The right to express his or her point of view 
 The right to obtain an explanation of the decision reached 
 The right to challenge the decision 
The GDPR adopts a more general approach than the previous Article 15.1 of the Data 
Protection Directive of 1995[4]. According to Article 22 GDPR, not only profiling, but any 
automatic processing with legal effects deserves suitable safeguards. This wider perspective 
is interesting because it is not limited to profiling, but it also includes other systems such as 
decision support systems. Decision making tools can obviously rely on data analysis to get 
statistical inferences. The problem is that these tools can affect data subjects. The following 
sections will consider decision-support systems as examples of automated decision-makers 
that affect the data subject. 
This will gain importance with the growing responsibilities of data controllers, including the 
requirement of data protection impact assessment (DPIA). DPIA could compile all the 
relevant safeguards for specific technologies and automatic processing and turn into a data 
generator for policy purposes (Fosch-Villaronga and Heldeweg 2017). The new obligations for 
data controller to conduct DPIA prior to processing are also worth noting (Article 35 GDPR). 
Moreover, corporations and public authorities whose main activity relies on profiling will also 
need a data protection officer (DPO) (Article 7 GDPR).  
According to Article 14.2(g), the data controller should provide the data subject with 
information about “the existence of automated decision-making, including profiling, referred 
to in Article 22 (1) and (4) and, at least in those cases, meaningful information about the logic 
involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences of such processing for 
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the data subject”. It has been said that the GDPR does not include a general right to 
explanation of automatic decisions (Wachter, S. and others, 2017). Nonetheless, providing 
suitable safeguards is one key aspect to consider in a world where automatic decisions, some 
of them with legal effects, will be part of any citizen’s daily experience[5].  
The following sections will describe the general and concrete suitable safeguards for 
automated decisions. In Section 2, some general safeguards are suggested, like transparency, 
participation, internal and external oversight, traceability and informal governance platforms. 
In Section 3, enforced safeguards for data analysis-based automatic decisions are described. 
Section 4 includes legal safeguards such as traditional judicial review. We will conclude with 
an overview of the safeguards identified in this paper and future challenges. 
  
2   IMPLEMENTING GENERAL SAFEGUARDS    
Some traditional safeguards like transparency, participation, the internal/external combined 
procedure and traceability might preserve Article 22 GDPR requirements in straightforward 
cases. Can these ordinary safeguards also be embedded in tools? Some tools not conceived 
initially as safeguards, like informal governance platforms, can perhaps be revamped to 
embed ordinary safeguards for automatic processing, like informal governance platforms, can 
also offer due protection. The following sections explain the benefits and drawbacks of such 
safeguards. 
2.1   TRANSPARENCY AND PARTICIPATION 
Transparency provides specific information to the data subject, while participation allows him 
or her to express his or her point of view. Transparency is usually envisioned as ex 
ante transparency, in the sense that the data controller informs the data subject in advance he 
will use his data for automated decision-making. The subject therefore has the possibility to 
give informed consent or to express his or her point of view. This is part of a data 
minimisation-based approach, necessary but not always sufficient when dealing with 
automated processing, as it has been highlighted (Koops, 2013). Some automatic processing 
tools only require general safeguards like transparency, participation, internal/external 
oversight and traceability. 
This is the case, for instance, with automated processing based on semantic annotation[6]. 
Some metadata are added to the text so that it automatically links different texts with related 
meaning. This can be used for classification and legal information retrieval and thus can fuel 
decision-making. These tools can easily preserve legal requirements because the links are 
based on legal knowledge. Legal ontologies can also be privacy-friendly automated decision 
tools[7]. The ontology is a formal structure with links between legal concepts that can be used 
by an algorithm or decision-making tool to perform automatic processing. If legal knowledge 
acquisition is properly implemented, these tools allow legal compliance. Indeed, some 
automated processing tools can favour general safeguard effectiveness. This does not mean 
that all automatic processing is harmless. On the contrary, some tools are clearly challenging 
for the general safeguards mentioned here and would require additional protection (see 
below, section 3). 
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2.2   INTERNAL/EXTERNAL OVERSIGHT AND TRACEABILITY 
Ex-ante transparency and participation have limited effect in practice. The so-called decision 
transparency (Koops, 2013) focusses on the output of the decision-making. The safeguards for 
automatic processing need to also integrate decision-making. The ideal situation is real-time 
oversight, but this seems impossible or unnecessarily complicated. Indeed, a combination of 
regular internal monitoring and occasional external auditing might provide sufficient 
protection. 
We should avoid external blind review of automated processing, only based on the 
proportionality principle or reasonability. The latter would occur when a court, a data 
protection authority (DPA) or another authority, with no relevant information on the 
monitored decision-making, decides whether the outcome is proportionate or reasonable[8]. 
But how can a judge assess the necessity or adequacy of a processing without closely 
monitoring the internal process? Internal monitoring, for instance by a DPO, is thus crucial 
for subsequent review. Only if the DPO, or equivalent, has access to the decision making, can 
it eventually evaluate real-time outcomes. The DPA or court external review indeed relies on 
the accuracy of the inner oversight. This is therefore a combined perspective of the safeguards, 
which complements transparency and participation, and contributes to GDPR compliance in 
the following manner:  
 Internal supervision 
The desirable procedure would be prior confirmation or validation by a human expert. 
Some machine-to-machine (M2M) tools will make it impossible for humans to confirm 
in real time the extent of the decision-making. Therefore, a confirmation or validation 
after the automatic decision is needed. Some tools use machine-learning techniques to 
improve future recommendations with past events. This can reinforce automatic 
decision making, and hence the confirmation of “trends” will also require human 
oversight. 
The Data Protection Officer (DPO) or other expert is in charge of the internal 
supervision: 
 The DPO or expert should be a member of the decision-making staff, an expert 
with field knowledge of the decision-making. 
 In the performance of his duties, he should follow instructions from no one. 
 He should ensure, in an independent manner, compliance with Article 22. 
 He should ensure that a written record of transmission and receipt of personal 
data is kept according to the rules of procedure and under secure conditions. He 
should concretely ensure that the logs are kept. 
 He should ensure that data subjects are informed of their rights at their request. 
 To support these tasks, the expert or DPO shall have access to all the data 
processed by the automated decision tool. 
Should the DPO or the expert find the processing does not comply with the GDPR, 
s/he then shall inform the decision-making board and refer the matter to the external 
supervisor. This could improve GDPR compliance and maybe exonerate the DPO from 
further responsibilities, although this should need further exploration.  
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 External supervision 
Not only internal oversight can help the implementation of Article 22, but external 
supervision also has a key role for this purpose. National Data Protection Authorities 
(DPA) or other more specialised institutions can evaluate posteriori the DPO criteria 
adopted on case-by-case basis or explicitly held in best practices or codes of conduct 
of the company. 
The implementation of accountability measures can also have a negative side: the introduction 
of breach risks. Managing access to logs and traceability is thus a priority for efficient external 
oversight. Koops provides some interesting examples of transparency legislation that could 
enhance control structure and procedures (Koops, 2013). He suggests preserving not only the 
process transparency, but also the decision or outcome transparency[9]. He also claims for 
receptors capable of understanding and using the information, which adds a new perspective 
to the external supervision: can we rely on Courts and DPA for this important task? We 
therefore need to enhance legal safeguards, and we will suggest some ways to do it below 
(see, section 4).           
2.3   SAFEGUARDS EMBEDDED IN INFORMAL GOVERNANCE 
PLATFORMS 
The NanoSafetyCluster[10], a platform for safety assessment, is perhaps the best example of 
informal governance platforms that could eventually evolve into a legal decision-making tool 
for nanotechnology. Such informal clusters or platforms could effectively provide 
transparency and internal/external oversight, all in an integrated package. Not initially 
conceived as legal decision-making tools nor safeguards, they however fail in one crucial 
point: they do not include the public interest. Stakeholders suggest and agree on lists of risks 
and criteria, and afterwards some of the results are included in EU recommendations. 
Moreover, there is always the danger of capture of the lawmaker by the stakeholders and 
other representatives of legitimate, but not general, interests[11]. 
However, the fact that these platforms were not initially conceived as safeguarding tools does 
not necessarily mean they could not effectively serve this purpose. Indeed, they could play a 
role in automated processing if they evolve from governance platforms to an institutional 
framework, and if they include embedded transparency and internal/external oversight. 
They currently only provide a dynamic decision-making framework on legal principles, 
including experts and stakeholders. Perhaps the Global Privacy Enforcement Network 
(GPEN), which strengthens public authorities’ capacities for cross-border cooperation, and 
the European Data Protection Board (EDPD) can also have an important role[12].        
  
3   NEW CHALLENGES DUE TO DATA ANALYSIS-
BASED AUTOMATED PROCESSING 
Automatic decisions based on data analysis will require enforced safeguards. The general 
safeguards mentioned in section 2 cannot offer effective protection against this kind of 
automatic decision-making. 
  
European Journal of Law and Technology Vol 8, No 3 (2017)  
 
6 
 
3.1 GENERAL SAFEGUARDS WILL NOT WORK WITH DATA 
ANALYSIS-BASED AUTOMATED PROCESSING 
Data analysis raises challenges for at least the following legal areas: “transparency and 
information obligations of data controllers; consent (including consent in case of 
repurposing); the need to balance public interest and the interests of data subjects for 
legitimising personal data processing; the regulation of profiling; and proper safeguarding of 
digital rights in case of data transfers to third parties and third countries and access to EU 
data”[13]. A complete Big Data threat landscape is now available[14]. The combination of big 
data with statistical correlations is most challenging for automatic processing from the 
perspective of Article 22. The reason is that statistical correlations completely neglect legal 
theories or legal requirements, in this case the GDPR. It is difficult to embed legal 
requirements such as those envisaged in Article 22 GDPR in the decision-making tool. 
In this section, we argue that general safeguards – specific information to the data subject; the 
right to obtain human intervention; the right to express his or her point of view; the right to 
obtain an explanation of the decision reached; and the right to challenge the decision – may 
not work in the case of data analysis-based automated processing: 
 Right to be informed: Similar to the right to access under Article 12(a) of the Data 
Protection Directive (“communication to him [the user] in an intelligible form of the 
data undergoing processing and of any available information as to their source”) it is 
only a very first step towards an effective safeguard against the effects of a decision-
making. 
 Right to obtain human intervention: When a decision is based on data analysis, 
human intervention cannot alter the result, unless it simply takes into consideration 
the statistical correlation. This implies a clear risk: human intervention may in the 
future be only a formal requisite, but with no actual effect on the automatic 
processing. This will push future DPO or equivalent internal human officer 
knowledge on data analysis so as he can discriminate relevant correlations from 
other irrelevant statistical links with no value for the decision-making. Another 
consideration has to do with the purpose of such human intervention, which it is not 
only to exclude discrimination and profiling of minors, but also to reduce false 
positives[15]. The possibility of having false positives due to meaningless statistical 
correlations is a major risk scenario to be tackled by human expert data analyst 
intervention. Obviously, even without false positives the tool can also discriminate 
and have negative effects on citizens. 
Therefore, the right to express his or her point of view is also needed. But it will be difficult to 
contest an automatic decision without a clear explanation of the decision reached. To 
challenge such an automatic data-based decision, only a multidisciplinary team with data 
analysts will be able to detect false positives and discriminations. The human intervention has 
thus a crucial double role: on the one hand, it must filter false positives; and on the other hand 
it must allow future strict scrutiny of the decision-making by the external monitoring 
institution (DPA, courts or other accredited institutions).       
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3.2   BIG DATA ANALYTICS VALUE CHAIN PET, NOT 
CONCRETE AND ISOLATED PET 
The privacy by design strategies described by ENISA in its 2014 Report still offers valuable 
general principles to solve the privacy risks related to data analysis-based automatic 
processing in a collaborative manner[16]. These include: data minimisation, guidance on 
hidden data, separate data, aggregate data, informing data subjects, data subjects control of 
their data, privacy policy and compliance by stakeholders. Data analysis-based automated 
processing will require more than mere technological measures for compliance. 
The application of such principles will require continuous legal monitoring and a technical 
solution update. In a nutshell, PbD when dealing with data analysis tools will require strategic 
capabilities: an alignment between IT and the legal requirements. PbD will resemble, in this 
case, a regulatory process dealing with IT options. This alignment will only be achieved if 
DPA, data controllers and big data analytics actively and permanently interact to implement 
PbD. 
Although no concrete or isolated privacy-enhancing technology (PET) pack can provide 
enough protection unless it considers the so-called “big data analytics value chain”[17], it has 
been argued that “big data with privacy” is technically possible[18]. More than a singular 
measure, privacy-preserving for data analysis tools requires a general approach: automated 
policy definitions and enforcement defined with semantics and relevant standards, and 
cryptographic implementation. This promotes a clash between utility and privacy, which is 
usually managed by some techniques like k-anonymity for data releases, differential privacy 
for data queries and perturbative approaches for streaming data. Local anonymization and 
collaborative anonymization can also offer better protection than centralised anonymization. 
In some cases, lawyers will not only have to call for technical support; they will have to 
cooperate with computer scientists at the risk of leaving the data analysis to engineers who 
do not possess legal background/expertise. 
3.3   PRIVACY-PRESERVING AUTOMATED DECISIONS 
Is there any privacy-friendly automated processing alternative to PETs mentioned in 3.2? 
Some artificial intelligence (AI) techniques called E-institutions, Social Artificial Intelligence, 
Multi-agent Systems, Social Technical Systems, and also Hybrid Online Social Systems 
(HOSS) could provide new possibilities in this respect[19].   
E-Institutions, like conventional institutions, facilitate coordination between agents through a 
restricted context where only some objects and entities exist, with interactions allowed 
according to institutional constraints. This is from a social AI or Artificial Social Intelligence 
perspective, where agent actions cause an electronic state. Compliance rules and principles 
are part of these tools, and thus legal theories can be enshrined at the core of these automatic 
decision-making institutions. Indeed, compliance and enforcement become crucial for 
electronic institutions, and there is always a descriptive specification of the rules or 
conventions. According to these rules, agents can enter an organisation, play a role in it, or 
even leave it. In some of these e-institutions, agents are even allowed to violate rules, although 
the tool tries to encourage compliance imposing sanctions. These electronic institutions 
involve many activities or meetings, which are connected according to the characteristics of 
the institution. Some possible dialogues between agents are defined, according to their 
  
European Journal of Law and Technology Vol 8, No 3 (2017)  
 
8 
 
respective role in the institution. This leads to a scene network, and agents move from one 
scene to another. The institution thus provides an interaction framework with atomic 
interactions, but also social ones, like joining or leaving the institution and creating or 
terminating scenes. Therefore, the different parts to define include scenes networks, 
transitions, electronic institution and institutional state. As a result, a restricted virtual 
environment is built, with all interactions taking place according to the institutional rules or 
conventions: it is called a “normative multi-agent system”, where the electronic institution 
creates the institutional reality: procedural and functional conditions for the interaction of 
agents[20]. 
We suggest that these electronic institutions can effectively support legal compliance and 
become privacy-preserving automated processing. They have been used so far to support a 
wide variety of applications: 
 Fish markets: agents interact by means of communication, making a bid in the fish 
market. Some auction scenes or meetings are implemented, in which buyers compete 
to purchase fish. A variation of the traditional Dutch auction protocol provides the 
principal scene: an auction. The auctioneer choses an item, opens a bidding, and for 
each successive price the auctioneer calls, one, several or no buyers, submit a bid; 
and this is repeated until there are no more goods left[21]. 
 Water virtual market: each basin institution is under the supervision of the 
government authority, according to a concrete contractual agreement. Specific 
guidelines based on legal documents are not only welcomed but also required for the 
proper functioning of the tool. Based on this, there is also the need for coherence and 
traceability of the normative environment. As a result, a virtual market for water 
rights is proposed, with traceable rights parameters, buyer, seller profiles and 
populations[22]. 
 Agent based simulation for archaeology and cultural heritage is another example of 
normative – with technical constraints, not obviously legal rules – multi agent 
system. Concretely, a 3D virtual world is integrated into an institutional framework 
and enables automatic generation of the corresponding 3D environment, if needed. 
The autonomous agents reproduce the way of life of ancient people in 3000 B.C 
Mesopotamia in virtual worlds, with regulation of interactions[23]. 
 Other applications have been also envisioned as applications for mutual support, 
scientific assessment and hotel management, for instance. 
These current applications are certainly far from what legal automated decisions will require, 
but they represent the main components of what a future automated processing tool may look 
like in the future. Privacy-preserving electronic institutions are technically possible, and could 
empower future legal automated processing to have automatically compliant tools instead of 
mere data analysis-based automated processing with no legal roots. 
Instead of simply building safeguards for existing automated processing, the legal domain 
should suggest a PbD automatic processing that naturally embeds the safeguards – and the 
rights – into them. Contrary to what has been argued in the literature (Koops and Leenes 
2014), there do not seem to be technical problems precluding data analysis in electronic 
institutions like the ones we have described here. This can be an option to the existing PET for 
data analysis-based automated processing: its embedment into a privacy-friendly electronic 
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institution. This may certainly add costs to the data-driven initial tools, but in the end it may 
suffice to have a privacy-friendly resulting framework.   
  
4   ENHANCING LEGAL SAFEGUARDS 
Apart from building technical standards and encouraging privacy-friendly automated 
processing, there is a complementary perspective to consider: to empower legal safeguards 
when dealing with automated decisions. This can be achieved by empowering an external 
oversight, which could be a court, a DPA or another authority[24]. If we take the requirement 
of human intervention seriously, both the internal oversight and the external monitoring 
should be empowered. As said before, the internal oversight must be accurate enough to allow 
future external auditing. We should now try to describe how we could obtain an enhanced 
informed external oversight. 
 The efficiency of the external oversight will largely depend on the authority entitled to review 
the automated decision and the inner monitoring. A regular judge, for instance, may not be 
equipped enough to assess the level of protection afforded by the tool and the internal 
oversight[25]. An independent authority could perhaps fulfil better this task, but one cannot 
neglect the role of judicial review[26].  Although it may require education and the provision 
of additional tools and systems, this is a good occasion to empower courts for this crucial new 
commitment: the external monitoring of automated processing and due process with human 
intervention. As mentioned before, decision transparency may be a good complement to 
process transparency. This has one (un)solvable challenge: the decision logic might not be 
understood, and effective monitoring is thus at risk. Therefore, the internal and external 
oversight need to be modelled together, not independently, in order the former provides all 
the relevant information to the latter to evaluate the adopted decision. 
Coordination and reporting will be, therefore, key aspects of this combined safeguard. This 
may result in having one single monitoring process carried out by two different authorities: 
one permanent oversight of the DPO or equivalent, and another one, occasional and accessed 
by the user. In such case, the latter should in any case provide a latent monitoring to the 
former, and should provide indications or guidance. This basically means that the DPA, court 
or accredited authority will have permanent information from the DPO or equivalent 
oversight, to react if necessary as soon as possible. This requires technical and human expert 
support to shift external oversight into a sort of latent monitoring. Courts usually do not 
decide ex officio and only proceed once the previous court/authority has adopted a decision. 
Therefore, these are aspects that will have to be carefully considered if the external oversight 
of automated processing is assigned to courts. 
Moreover, in this paper we have always considered non-legal automatic decisions. But 
judicial automated decision support systems might soon appear[27]. So, the general 
framework here depicted will have to include in the future this new scenario and extend the 
general safeguards to it.                  
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5   CONCLUSIONS 
According to Article 22 GDPR, automated processing, including profiling, can produce legal 
effects concerning people and this should be banned. As a potential remedy, the European 
lawmaker envisions in this case the need for human intervention. Moreover, a contractual 
clause, a Union or Member State law or explicit consent can legitimate automated decision-
making. Even though this Article bans discrimination for special categories and child’s data 
for this purpose, it eventually allows automatic processing, conditional on suitable 
safeguards. Our contribution has shed light on these safeguards, considering different 
automated processing in order to protect the rights and freedoms and legitimate interests of 
the data subject. 
We have first identified general safeguards for respectful techniques, like semantic annotation 
or legal ontologies, prone to embed legal requirements. These general safeguards are 
transparency and participation, internal and external oversight and traceability. We also argue 
that these safeguards can even be technically embedded in informal governance platforms, 
and this could be beneficial to a discussion between law-makers and stakeholders. 
The current state of the art reveals that automatic processing tools based on data analysis are 
more challenging because statistical correlations completely neglect legal requirements like 
Article 22 provisions. Because of that, they will require enhanced safeguards. The PET or 
Transparency Enhancing Technologies (TET) communities are now discussing on Big Data 
Analytics Value Chain PET. Instead of a single measure, data analysis requires a process 
involving a combination of PET. 
We also considered the possibility of privacy-preserving automated decisions, e.g. enshrining 
legal safeguards into electronic institutions. These automatic tools can even embed data 
analytics and then provide legal requirements to data-driven tools. In the future, these 
electronic institutions may not only serve governance or compliance purposes, but can also 
play an important role as enhanced legal safeguards. It is too soon to forecast what type of 
safeguard will eventually prevail, but future revisions or guidelines on the application of the 
GDPR could perhaps contemplate such possibility. 
As a side note, monitoring automated processing requires close latent scrutiny of the daily or 
weekly activity of the DPO or equivalent internal institution. Moreover, automatic processing 
tools may also require other improvements such as the empowerment of Courts and other 
external authorities as external oversights. Traditional legal safeguards are not yet conceived 
for such a review. Meanwhile, new scenarios are appearing and will have to be added to those 
here described: some risk assessment tools might soon evolve into predictive algorithms for 
judicial review. Therefore, automatic legal decisions will also be technically possible.  
As a closing remark, it is important to state once again the importance of interdisciplinarity 
as an indispensable condition for the successful application of the GDPR. If lawyers continue 
to overlook the technical sides of the regulation, not only will Article 22 of the GDPR (among 
others) not be appropriately implemented, but the rights of the data subjects will also be at 
risk. 
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